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Evolutionary Theory A New Way of "Explaining" Evolution
Formal unity (the quest to subsume all observed phenomena under some singular, Platonic ideal or covering law). Substantive unity(the quest to find the core material particles on which reality is grounded). Explanatory unity(the quest for a "smoking gun," or the one and only first cause of events). Monological science is the science of laws and forces, which, its supporters claim, should be sufficient to explain in one clean sweep the causal links stretching in time from A to B to C. Most of us recognize this science as that of Galileo, Newton, La Place, and Einstein—the science of irreversible physics and linear determinism. It is also the science of induction: observe the particularities of phenomena and then propose covering laws that explain the forces that cause them. This is good science, for sure, and has brought us a long way, Ogilvy noted, but it does have its limits. And as Ogilvy pointed out, one of those limits is its inability to explain evolution. After all, the nature of evolution is anything but monological. In fact, it seems to have a logic all of its own—one that cannot be translated without remainder into the paradigm of monological science. This theme—the unique (and perhaps untranslatable) logic of evolution—has continually surfaced during the course of five years of inquiry into "evolution writ large" in these Esalen conferences. During that time, Ogilvy has come to the view that what these conferences have revealed is that to explain evolution requires embracing a new paradigm of explanation itself. Ogilvy thinks the prevalent monological explanations of evolutionary processes (e.g., neo-Darwinism) simply leave too much of the story outside of the explanation. After all, what good is the notion of evolution if its current rendition cannot adequately explain the phenomena of life, love, language, and consciousness? Ogilvy pointed out that most of the scholars who have come to the Esalen conferences over the past five years have been trying to break out of the monological worldview in the search for new ways of explaining evolution. For example, what unites the work of presenters like Steven Johnson and Terrence Deacon is that they both are exploring how novel epistemological frameworks can better explain complex phenomena as diverse as ant colonies and cities (Johnson) and human brains and semiotic communication (Deacon). Ogilvy thinks it is not too bold to suggest that a fundamentally new epistemological approach for the sciences has been trying to come forth in recent years—one that is not monological but rather stereoscopic. In this new way of thinking about and explaining nature, Ogilvy and others are placing the accent not on the linear causal steps leading from A to B to C, but rather on how a given phenomenon "C" fills a niche. The would-be causal arrows do not proceed in linear fashion up to C, but rather point at C from the surrounding context:
 "C" is explained by the niche it fills. Ogilvy concluded his presentation by offering the phrase "rolling compossibility" to capture the new focus among several scholars who are starting to view evolution as a grand exploration of "what is possible together." In previous conferences in this series, scholars like Peter Gogarten, Peter Corning, Robert Wright, Stuart Kauffman, and Gordon Wheeler each have drawn attention away from the view of evolution as an arena of brutal competition and instead have highlighted the role of synergy, cooperation, non-zero-sumness, inter-subjectivity, collective catalysis, and co-evolution. The things that survive are not so much the things that beat others (win-lose), but the things that can flourish together successfully (win-win). Overall, Ogivly thinks that this conference’s broad inquiry over the past five years—which truly has looked at the evolution of everything—has brought attention to the need for a new stereoscopic vision to guide all of the sciences. Telmo Pievanipresented a paper on Tuesday morning titled "The Italian Approach to Emergence, Contingent Evolution, and Consciousness: the Case of Human Evolution." Much like Ogilvy, Pievani has written extensively on how scholars must think differently when explaining evolution. Pievani’s work centers on the epistemological approach called "evolutionary pluralism," which has a number of resemblances to Ogilvy’s stereoscopic epistemology. This approach highlights the complex, creative, and constructive character of evolution, which arises from the inter-linking of a plurality of rhythms, levels, and causal factors. According to Pievani, natural selection is not a monological process that happens exclusively at the level of genes. Instead, selection occurs on multiple levels and in multiple arenas—in species, in populations, in individuals, in genes, and perhaps even at the level of the biosphere as a whole. Pievani thinks evolutionary pluralism is truer to the flexibility of Darwin’s original vision (a more stereoscopic vision, perhaps?), which was pushed aside by the twentieth century’s fascination with genetic reductionism and linear causal accounts proffered by the advocates of the so-called "Modern Synthesis" (a term coined by Julian Huxley in his 1942 book Evolution: The Modern Synthesis). Pievani cited a prominent example where reductionistic and monological thinking has dominated: the human genome project (HGP). The HGP started more than a decade ago in the early 1990s with an optimistic faith in finding one-to-one linear causal links between genes and traits. Nearly a decade and a half later, with much of the hype and overblown expectations having settled down, Pievani and others are using the HGP as a teaching case for the real challenge of understanding complexity in evolutionary processes. To do so, Pievani has drawn on the work of French sociologist and systems thinker Edgar Morin, whose several books on the topic of "complex thinking" (les pensées complex) have paved a philosophical pathway toward appreciating the real difficulty, irreducible complexity, and living multiplicity of systems at all levels (whether a cell, a galaxy, or a human society). According to Morin and Pievani, scientists must begin to think with, not against, the real complexity inherent in the human genome. At minimum, it must be considered a "self-eco-re-organized system": Self- for its own spontaneous ability to organize information Eco- for its co-evolutionary relationship to the environment Re- for its history of continuous re-arrangements of the same genes Where monological thinking has sought to simplify the real diversity and complexity in the genome by using the myth of genetic determinism, complex thinking embraces the challenge of understanding the relationships among the multiple convoluted levels that inform and constitute the genome. The challenge and promise of complex thinking is much like that of Ogilvy’s stereoscopic thinking: it is the challenge of embracing and thinking with the true relational complexity that is interwoven into all living systems. Pievani continued by describing his recent work in evolutionary epistemology. In particular, he has critiqued the inadequate epistemological doctrines that inform adaptationism and representationism. Drawing on the legacy of the Chilean biologist Francisco Varela, Pievani has pointed out the close family resemblance between the representational approach to explaining consciousness (the human mind merely represents the external objective world) and the adaptationist approach to evolution (organisms passively adapt to the environment by following the "instructions" in their genes). Both of these views presume that there is a pre-given external world or environment to which organisms must match their internal maps of reality. Thus, adaptationists tend to view evolution in terms of the progressive and optimal adaptation of traits to a pre-given world. The most optimal traits are the ones with the best match or fit. Pievani thinks the adaptationist view fails to account for the inherently co-creative, eco-self-organizing, and spontaneously constructive nature of evolution. Evolution may be less like progress up a fitness landscape and more like a rhapsodic exploration of the possible. (Rhapsody comes from the Greek rhaptein, meaning to sew or stitch together.) Evolution stitches together and recombines elements and sees what might come from them. Pievani concluded by emphasizing that the evolutionary record might be more accurately viewed as an exploration of vast possibilities. This ongoing exploration—sometimes by functional adaptation and other times by historical chance and tinkering—can even be viewed as having a sacred quality to it. Pievani pondered whether the notion of a "sacrality of contingency" could perhaps replace the meaningless machine-like image of the universe that has accompanied monological science. A view of evolution that is limited by single-level genetic reductionism leaves no room for the spirit of freedom and the free exploration of the possible. On this note, Pievani once again drew from the work of the recently deceased Francisco Varela, who said in his last interview before he died that the ontology of the world may be thought of as feminine. A feminine ontology is one that is open and permissive—it keeps itself ever oriented to the realm of the possible. Further Questions for "Explaining" Evolution How can the need to provide richer and more complex explanatory frameworks be reconciled with the public’s seeming need for simple stories and sound bites, which are perpetuated regularly in the mass media (the gene for depression, etc.)? Does stereoscopic epistemology require a new metaphysical framework, or are more complex thinking skills sufficient to explain the developments in the chaos and complexity sciences? Circular causality and circular definitions have traditionally been considered weak explanations. What features need to be emphasized in circular causal accounts in order for them to be considered strong explanations? Can circular causal accounts be reconciled with linear ones? Can they complement each other, like particle and wave? Does the accent on "rolling compossibility" and a "feminine ontology of permissivity and possibility" suggest that Michael Murphy’s thesis in The Future of the Body (which catalogues a vast array of greater possibilities for human development) is well-placed within the context of the emerging stereoscopic and pluralistic view of evolution?
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